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Saints and Saintliness1 
 
JOHN COTTINGHAM 
 
‘The greatest saints … show themselves, and there is no question; every one perceives their 
strength and stature. Their sense of mystery in things, their passion, their goodness, irradiate 
about them and enlarge their outlines while they soften them. They are like pictures with an 
atmosphere and background; and placed alongside of them, the strong men of this world and no 
other seem as dry as sticks, as hard and crude as blocks of stone or brickbats.’ (James 1960 
[1902]: 364) 
 
1. Understanding sainthood 
There are a number of potential difficulties that beset the philosophical study of sainthood. 
To begin with, the concept of sainthood is integrally connected with questions about morality 
and how we should live; indeed arguably the concept of sainthood (like many religious 
concepts) can only be adequately understood within a framework that gives primacy to this 
moral dimension. This may present an obstacle to the proper philosophical discussion of 
sainthood, given the compartmentalized nature of much contemporary academic philosophy, 
where the ‘ethicist’ and the ‘epistemologist’ often pursue very disparate agendas. Yet if we 
leave the confines of academic specialisms and start to look at how human life is actually 
lived, it becomes clear that our cognitive grasp of reality, what we know and understand of 
the world, often depends in crucial respects not just on what the world is like, but also on 
what we are like: how our sensibilities are cultivated and attuned, what we pay attention to, 
what distractions and temptations we have learned to set aside, how earnestly we persevere 
in the quest for sincerity and integrity, and how our perceptual powers are refined through 
experience— including the painful experience of sacrifice and suffering. The saint seems to be 
a paradigm case of someone for whom the process of interior moral transformation has 
reshaped their perception of the world and their grasp of reality. So although the focus of the 
present volume is an epistemological one, it will be important for the purposes of this chapter 
not to construe ‘epistemological’ in too circumscribed a way; for the life of the saint may turn 
out to be a life in which the epistemic and the ethical aspects are inseparably fused.  
The remarks of William James in our opening epigraph suggest as a starting point for 
inquiry the idea that the great saints can be recognized by certain shining qualities whose 
value is manifest to all. Yet here a second potential difficulty presents itself, namely that it is 
far from obvious that there is as much of a consensus on the relevant praiseworthy qualities 
as James supposes. For in judging the value of sainthood, the theist may wish to employ 
standards that may appear debatable or questionable to those who reject the theistic 
framework. Moreover, standards of value, methods of inquiry, and the extent of religious 
allegiance in a given society, are all factors that are liable to change over time; and in this 
connection it is remarkable how much the cultural landscape has altered since William James 
presented his Varieties of Religious Experience at the start of the last century. In one way 
James saw his own empirical methods as very ‘modern’ and radical: he proposed, in his 
chapter on saintliness, to ‘measure the worth of a religion’s fruits in merely human terms of 
value’ (James 1960 [1902]: 322)— something he clearly felt might ruffle the prevailing 
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religious sensibilities of the time. But in spite of that, his attitude to sainthood, as is clear from 
our opening epigraph, was often very positive; and his general tone is one of open-minded 
interest and broad respect for many aspects of the religious outlook. By contrast, the 
‘naturalist revolution’ (Leiter 2004: 2-3), which has increasingly swept through philosophy at 
the start of our own century, accords scant respect to theistic ideas and frameworks. For the 
most part, the moral concepts relevant to sainthood that figure so prominently in the theist’s 
worldview— sacrifice, grace, redemption, purification, blessedness, and so on— tend to be 
ignored as irrelevant to an acceptable moral philosophy. 
There are a number of possible responses to this problem. Philosophers and 
theologians who are believers could perhaps resolve to discuss the topic of sainthood only 
amongst themselves, answerable only to ‘the criteria of the Christian community’ (to adapt a 
phrase of Alvin Plantinga from a slightly different context; Plantinga 1983: 77), or to some 
other explicitly religious standard. But in so far as the typical theist is committed to the 
religious worldview not just as an academic exercise but as something that is believed to 
irradiate and give value to all aspects of human life, he or she will surely want to reach out 
and attempt to communicate beyond the circle of co-religionists. So if sainthood is to be more 
than an esoteric notion that is ignored in the secular academy, the religious philosopher will 
want to discuss it in a way that at least may allow the sceptic or the non-believer to glimpse 
why it might be an epistemically and morally interesting notion, irrespective of whether or 
not it is finally accepted. This kind of ‘bridge-building’ approach is the one that will be 
adopted in what follows,  
A further, and rather different, problem that arises for anyone who wishes to take 
saints and the saintly life as a topic for philosophical inquiry is that the very enterprise may 
seem presumptuous. For what academic writer, it may be asked, indulging in the luxury of 
airing his or her views from the comparative comfort of the study or the campus office, has a 
right to talk about the interior life of those who devote their lives to God? A possible response 
here is that in any inquiry into a distinctive form of human life there will always be a risk of a 
gap between the life of the inquirer and the life of the individual or group being studied, but 
this is not to say that no attempts can be made to narrow the gap, albeit in a small way. If we 
grant (as Wittgenstein suggested), that is necessary to attempt in some way to enter a form of 
life if we are to aspire to understand it (Wittgenstein 1958: Part I, § 23), then this implies 
something important about the appropriate methods of inquiry for studying notions like 
sainthood. The habits of thought developed by philosophers of religion often predispose them 
to look at things in a fairly abstract and theoretical way, focusing on the analysis and 
evaluation of propositions, the truth or falsity of beliefs espoused by religious adherents, and 
the degree to which those beliefs are supported by argument and evidence. All this is 
perfectly valid, and valuable; but a proper philosophical understanding of religious 
phenomena requires us to take account of much more. To be religious is not just to subscribe 
to certain doctrines, it is to follow a certain way of life and to take up certain commitments. 
Perhaps most importantly, it has always been understood as a learning process, or a process 
of training or askesis, as the Greeks called it. It is a discipline that involves not just the 
theoretical acquisition of knowledge, but a structured programme supported by rules and 
practices.  
This observation has direct relevance for the understanding of saints and saintliness, 
since it points us towards the disciplines of spirituality (including prayer, fasting, meditation 
and the like), which are, in many traditions, absolutely central to the saintly life. The term 
‘discipline’ comes from the Latin verb discere, ‘to learn’; but the learning envisaged here is not 
merely intellectual but also moral. The goal is to change, to set aside the spurious goals of self-
enrichment, and to grow in wisdom and love of the good. And for this reason, the ‘conversion’ 
at which spiritual practices have traditionally been aimed, and to which the saint aspires, is 
not conceived as something that can be completed on a particular day, or even over a single 
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season, but is thought of as a lifelong process. Thus the Rule of St Benedict, dating from the 
first century AD, speaks of a conversatio morum, often translated ‘conversion of life’, a 
continuous reshaping and renewal of one’s whole character and way of life. Reflecting further 
on this conception of sanctity as the goal of a lifelong journey may do something to mitigate 
the apparent presumptuousness referred to a moment ago— the presumptuousness of the 
philosopher or theologian who ventures to scrutinize and evaluate the phenomenon of 
saintliness while pursuing the often very worldly career of a contemporary professional 
academic. For if sainthood is not so much a finally achieved state as the goal of a long and 
continuous process, it becomes easier to see it as not something wholly set apart from the 
normal, but as having some relation to the ordinary struggles and failings of the rest of us.  
This brings us to a final issue in this introductory trawl of problems relating to the 
concept of sainthood, namely the relation between the saintly and the normal human life. As 
commonly used, it is clear that the term ‘saint’ is taken to refer to someone who is far 
advanced on the path of holiness. And this is why saints are revered both as exemplars, and 
also as people whose lives and witness contribute importantly to the spiritual development of 
more ordinary mortals. As Austin Farrer eloquently put it: 
 
Nature is tested by masterful violence, but if God is to be known, it is by humble obedience, 
and by patient waiting for Him … No one has the spirituality to prove anything absolutely, 
and the spirituality of the ordinary believer is negligible equipment compared with that of 
the saint. What is received on authority must be proved in action, and yet it is never so 
proved that it could not be proved more …. The religious mind, incapable of proving faith 
in seventy years of imperfection, adds the years of others to its own and extends 
experiment by proxy (Farrer 1957: 90, cited in MacSwain 2013: 156).  
 
Saints, in short, are important to the ordinary believer both morally, because they inspire us, 
and also epistemically, because their lives provide authoritative evidence for the truth and 
value of the theistic outlook that we might find hard to access directly (compare Zagzebski 
2012). Farrer’s suggestion is not just that the saints are examples for us to imitate, but also 
that their training and devotion may have put them in a position to experience personally 
aspects of reality that ordinary mortals may only glimpse dimly and sporadically. Saintly lives 
can be thought of, in Farrer’s terms, as an ‘extension’ of an experiment that for most of us has 
to remain incomplete; their moral and spiritual growth has allowed them to discern 
dimensions of reality that others may simply take on faith.  
Nevertheless, despite the undoubted special status of sainthood in these respects, it is 
worth noting that there is also an enduring strand in the Judaeo-Christian tradition which 
insists that the call to embark on the long road of moral transformation is one that is 
addressed to all— often, perhaps especially, to sinners and those who lead ordinary flawed 
human lives (see Jeremiah 31:9; Hosea 14: 2-5; Luke 5:32; Mark 2:17; Matthew 9:13). This 
connects with the point just made about the saints being in an epistemically superior position, 
able to discern aspects of reality which others glimpse very imperfectly. The saint may 
admittedly have something of the authority and status of an expert, as Austin Farrer implies 
in the above quotation, but it is not clear that the resulting knowledge is ‘transmittable’ in 
quite the way expert scientific knowledge is (where, for example, the layperson may say he 
knows about structure of the atom because he takes on trust the knowledge of the 
professionals). For if the religious call is addressed to all, it will not be enough for us simply to 
receive the wisdom of the experts; each of us is required to strive as best we may to advance 
at least some way along the road they trod, so as to set about purifying and enriching our 
knowledge of the good and starting to bring our lives into conformity with it. So although the 
historical study of saints and sainthood will, quite legitimately, focus on those outstanding 
exemplars who are conventionally depicted with haloes and who have ‘St’ in front of their 
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names, part of what gives the philosophical and theological study of saintliness its appeal is 
precisely that it is not a category that is impossibly far removed from ‘ordinary’ human life, 
but one that can, if the theistic outlook is correct, be integrated into a coherent framework 
designed to apply to all. 
 
2. The value and scope of the saintly life 
The idea just broached, that the goals of the saintly life may be ones that are in principle 
applicable to all, or at least to be aspired to by all, may strike some as objectionably counter-
intuitive. In her much anthologized article ‘Moral Saints’, Susan Wolf makes the following 
observation: 
 
Given the empirical circumstances of our world, it seems to be an ethical fact that we have 
unlimited potential to be morally good, and endless opportunity to promote moral 
interests. But this is not incompatible with the not-so-ethical fact that we have sound, 
compelling, and not particularly selfish reasons to choose not to devote ourselves 
univocally to realizing this potential or to taking up this opportunity. (Wolf 1982: 435; 
emphasis supplied)  
 
 Wolf’s conclusion is that common sense morality suggests that sainthood is an ‘unattractive 
or otherwise unacceptable’ ideal (Wolf 1982: 427). Her argument is partly based on the 
thought that devoting oneself entirely and completely to agapeic goals such as feeding the 
hungry or healing the sick would necessarily involve the sacrifice of countless other valuable 
but more personal activities, like ‘reading Victorian novels’ or ‘playing the oboe’. Put that 
starkly, it may seem that the defender of the saintly ethic could simply retort that that true 
compassion requires us to bite the bullet and sacrifice these agreeable activities. But Wolf’s 
underlying point is a more interesting one: although no one item in the long list of rewarding 
activities of this kind could be singled out as a necessary ingredient in a well-lived life, 
nevertheless ‘a life in which none of these possible ingredients of character are developed 
may seem to be a life strangely barren’ (Wolf 1982: 441). In short, the perfectionist ethic 
implied by the saintly ideal, for example in Christ’s injunctions to ‘be perfect’, or to ‘sell all you 
have and give to the poor’ (Matthew 5:48 and 19:21; Luke 18:22; Mark 10: 21), is charged 
with being harshly incompatible with any reasonable idea of what makes a human life fruitful 
and fulfilling. 
It is instructive in this connection to contrast the saintly Christian ideal with the more 
‘down-to-earth’ Aristotelian approach to the well-lived life. Generosity, like all moral virtues, 
is for Aristotle a mean between two flanking vices of excess and deficiency. So in the 
Aristotelian perspective, to take concern for others to the point of selling all you have and 
giving to the poor is not to earn extra points on the virtue scale: it is to go ‘over the top’ and 
slide down towards the vice of excess. Excessive self-giving, in Aristotle’s scheme of things, 
would miss the mark of virtue by sacrificing too much, just as, on the other side, refusal to 
give anything would miss the mark by displaying too little regard for others. To be sure, 
selfish tight-fistedness may for the Aristotelian be ethically worse than excessive giving; for 
an Aristotelian virtue is not always exactly equidistant from its flanking vices of excess and 
deficiency. But the fact remains that the Christian saint who gives up all for others is, to the 
Aristotelian way of thinking, lacking in that balanced sense of moderate self-esteem that is 
necessary for a fulfilled human life (Aristotle 325 BC, Bk 2, Chs 6 & 7; Cottingham 1991). 
We thus have a long and powerful strand in Western ethical thought, still vigorously at 
work today, that seems to run directly counter to the Christian ethic of saintly self-sacrifice. 
This strand allows a privileged or protected area for legitimate self-concern and personal 
flourishing, and sets limits on how much an individual can or should be expected to give up 
for others. How far, then, should our own understanding of saintliness be responsive to this 
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tradition? 
One possible response, an uncompromisingly critical one, would be to dismiss the 
whole concept of saintly self-sacrifice as, in the words of the philosopher John Mackie, the 
‘ethics of fantasy’ (Mackie 1977: 129-34). On this view, partly reflected in the arguments of 
Wolf referred to above, the Christian injunction to give up all for others is both 
psychologically and ethically suspect: it not only verges on being impossibly difficult to adopt, 
given certain deeply ingrained human impulses towards self-referential concerns, but, from 
an ethical point of view, appears incompatible with an enormous range of ordinary, 
intuitively quite legitimate, human pursuits (Cottingham 1983: sec. 2). This kind of objection 
can be linked to the ‘argument from integrity’, developed by Bernard Williams in connection 
with his well-known critique of utilitarianism. This latter ethic is often construed as requiring 
us to subordinate our own interests entirely to the goal of maximizing global utility; but, as 
Williams points out, it seems doubtful whether I could function as a human being at all unless 
my own individual pursuits and preferences were allowed some special weighting in my 
deliberations. It seems that I would disintegrate as an individual if I were obliged to drop any 
activity or project in which I was engaged whenever another project presented itself whose 
contribution to the general utility was marginally greater. Were such the case, it seems that I 
would have no real character— there would be no distinctive pattern to my life. I would 
simply be, in Williams’s phrase, a cog in a ‘satisfaction system’ which ‘happened to be near 
certain causal levers at a certain time’ (Williams 1981: 4). 
These debates over impartiality versus self-preference, which have loomed large in 
contemporary philosophical literature, prompt one to ask how far the Christian ideal of 
saintliness is really to be lumped together with the kind of global impartialism and 
impersonalism found in certain utilitarian and other secular ethical outlooks. It is certainly 
true that Christian ideals like that of the brotherhood of man (based on the idea of God as 
father of all) invite us to reach beyond the particularities of tribal and national allegiance, 
towards universal justice and respect for all humanity. Moreover, in interpreting the 
command to love one’s neighbour as oneself, Christ’s parable of the Good Samaritan invites us 
to regard as a ‘neighbour’ anyone in dire need or distress— an idea, as Nicholas Wolterstorff 
has recently shown, that has deep roots in the Hebrew bible, for example in the injunctions 
found in the Prophets and the Psalms to care for the ‘quartet of the vulnerable’—orphans, 
widows, the impoverished, and resident aliens (Zechariah 7: 9-19; Isaiah 1:17; Psalm 147:6; 
Wolterstorff 2008: 76). But in reflecting on these Scriptural insights it is important to notice 
that the Judaeo-Christian ethic by no means outlaws all partialities or special relationships; 
on the contrary, the duty of loyalty to family is enshrined in the ten commandments (Exodus 
20:12), and Christ is depicted in the Gospels as having close personal ties (for example, to his 
mother, to the ‘beloved disciple’ who was special to him, and to the family of Lazarus (see 
John 19: 25-7; John 11:35). If we take these examples into account, it seems a distortion to see 
the Christian saint as required to forswear all partialistic concerns and commitments in 
favour of complete impersonal detachment. Arguably, the love for one’s fellow creatures that 
forms the core of the Christian message is a love that is initially manifested not in some 
impersonal and detached concern for ‘humanity in general’, but rather in the committed 
relationships which we forge with those whom we encounter in our individual lives (this 
point is developed in Oderberg 2007). 
This last point has important implications for the structure of the saintly life. 
Reflecting on the extreme psychological difficulty of self-abnegation and self-sacrifice has led 
some critics to suppose that the ethic of saintliness is one we may admire from a distance, but 
which for the mass of mankind is far beyond what can be reasonably adopted into a feasible 
blueprint for the good life (I once took this view, in Cottingham 1991: 815-6). But as David 
Oderberg has persuasively argued, there are considerable costs involved in separating off 
saintliness as a special moral category in this way. ‘How can morality consist of a set of 
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[partialistic] norms for the mass of mankind yet be overlaid by an ideal that is completely at 
odds with what those norms require? It is to place the saint in a wholly different species of 
agent, as though she were not one of us— an exemplar for mankind’ (Oderberg 2007: 60). In 
short, if the Christian outlook is to provide a coherent model for human life, it seems that we 
must find a way of integrating the saintly ideal exemplified by Christ’s life into a pattern for 
living to which we can all, in principle, aspire. This means that there must be no radical 
discontinuity (as there is in much contemporary secular ethics) between the life that is 
required of us as ordinary human beings, and the kind of life that exemplifies saintliness.  
To explore this further, we need to delve deeper into the psychodynamics of the 
saintly life. For although saints are especially admirable people, they are not plausibly 
understood as strange beings governed by higher than ordinary standards of action, or 
obeying more than ordinarily compassionate and outgoing rules of conduct. Instead, the saint 
is better understood as someone subject to ordinary human weaknesses and temptations, yet 
one whose epistemic situation is progressively transformed and purified so that they start to 
understand themselves and their relation to their fellow humans in a new light. This in effect 
brings us back to the point made in section one about the integral connection between the 
moral and the epistemic dimensions of sainthood. Saints are not just those whose conduct 
rises above the norm; they are those whose epistemic powers (of discernment, of 
understanding, of perception) have undergone a transformation. And if the message of grace 
in the Gospels is true, this is transformation that all of us, however flawed, can in principle 
dare to aspire to. 
 
3. Saintliness and transformation 
Although Christian ideals such as sanctity of life generally receive scant attention in the 
contemporary academic world, there is a wealth of philosophical discussion of conduct that 
goes beyond what is normally expected or required. In particular, the moral category of the 
‘supererogatory’ has generated a very considerable philosophical literature (see Heyd 2012), 
and this category is often loosely linked with saintliness, following J. O. Urmson’s seminal 
article ‘Saints and Heroes’, which was mainly about supererogation (Urmson 1958). The 
origins of this category can be traced back to the middle ages, for example in Aquinas’s 
discussion of the distinction between ‘precepts’ (praecepta), which are commandments to be 
obeyed by all, and ‘counsels’ (consilia), which concern what is good and recommended, but 
not strictly required (Aquinas 1266-73, IaIIae Qu.108, art. 4 and IIaIIae Qu.184, art. 3). The 
basic idea has its roots in St Paul, who, for example, recommended chastity, but allowed that 
it might not be suitable for all (I Corinthians 7:25); in the Gospels, moreover, we find Jesus 
telling the rich young man ‘if you want to enter life, keep the commandments’, but adding that 
if he wants to be perfect, he should sell all his possessions for the poor (Matthew 19: 16-22). 
The nature and scope of the supererogatory became a subject of fierce dispute between 
Catholic and Protestant theologians following the Reformation (see Heyd 1982: ch. 1).  
For present purposes, however, we may simply note that the Christian ideal of 
saintliness in some respects seems to subvert the standard distinction between what is 
morally required and what is ‘above and beyond the call of duty’. In conventional morality, I 
have a duty not to harm others, but (with certain qualifications) I am not normally required 
to help them, and I am certainly not required to love them. But if we consult the Fourth 
Gospel, we find the following striking command issued by Jesus to his disciples, during his 
long discourse on the eve of the Passion: ‘A new commandment I give to you, that you love 
one another: as I have loved you, that you also love one another.’ (John 13:34) The Greek 
word translated as ‘commandment’ here is entolẽ, the term normally used in the Septuagint 
Greek version of the Hebrew Bible to translate mitzvah, plural mitzvot, the commandments 
given by God to the Israelites via Moses. So not only the solemn context (the night of his 
betrayal and arrest leading to his death), but also the specific terminology-of-command used 
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by Christ, make this saying pregnant with authoritative force. The disciples are solemnly 
enjoined to love one another. 
 If commands flowing from God generate moral obligations, then the inference from 
this (given certain premises of the Christian faith about the status of Christ) will be that the 
disciples of Christ were placed under a moral obligation to love one another. Indeed, 
assuming that this saying of Christ was meant to apply not just to those actually present at the 
time, but to disciples of Christ generally, it will follow that all Christians are under an 
obligation to love one another. And a further short step, if we combine this with other 
teachings of Christ such as the parable of the Good Samaritan, will take us to the conclusion 
that all followers of Christ are under an obligation to show love to any fellow human being in 
need. The upshot is that Christian ethics makes obligatory or required what in many other 
ethical systems is thought of as at best supererogatory— loving one’s fellow human being. 
Loving every fellow human, even one’s enemies (Matthew 5:44), is normally taken to be the 
hallmark of a saint; but the above reasoning suggests that in the Christian conception we are 
all called to be saints in this sense. 
 An obvious objection to this conception is based on the maxim that ‘ought’ implies 
‘can’. The actions of a ‘minimally decent Samaritan’, to use Judith Jarvis Thomson’s phrase 
(Thomson 1971) may be within the reach of all of us; giving a cup of water to a thirsty beggar 
is one thing, but loving them is surely not within our voluntary control, so cannot be a duty 
(except perhaps for a very rare kind of person who is constituted differently from the rest of 
us). To respond to this objection we need to take into account the idea broached towards the 
end of the previous section, about sainthood involving a progressive epistemic 
transformation. The teachings of Christ include an account of a final judgment separating the 
‘sheep’ and the ‘goats’, where those who failed to reach out to the hungry or homeless or 
prisoners are told by the King: ‘whatever you did not do for one of the least of these my 
brothers, you did not do for me.’ (Matthew 25: 45). A long tradition of subsequent Christian 
teaching enjoins us to ‘see Christ in the stranger’. And what this seems to imply is not that in 
the search for perfection the saint should grit his teeth and try to find a repulsive ragged 
beggar somehow ‘loveable’ in a sentimental way, but rather that he or she should start to see 
something authentically Christlike in the very humanity and vulnerability of the human being 
now in front of him.  
There are two ways of construing this transformed or purified state to which the saint 
must aspire. One is that the kind of moral improvement envisaged consists simply in faithful 
obedience to the commands of Christ to feed the hungry, visit the sick and so on— in other 
words, that the saint is a person who changes volitionally so as to be willing to conform his 
actions to what is divinely required just because it is divinely required. But a more plausible 
interpretation is suggested by the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, namely that ‘the person 
who loves become more and more intimate with the commandment, becomes at one with the 
commandment’ (Kierkegaard 1985: 375-376). This is convincingly glossed by Stephen Evans 
as the claim that ‘a person … who is perfected in love ceases to experience that call to love as 
a duty’ (Evans 2013: 86).    
If we follow up the implications of this idea, it seems promising to construe the 
process of being ‘perfected in love’ as a kind of shift of perception. Instead of being viewed as 
belonging to a despised category that invites neglect or exclusion (the ‘scrounger’, the 
‘welfare recipient’), the person in need starts to be seen as a human being like myself, with 
whom I might easily had changed places, had things gone differently. The aspiring saint’s eyes 
are progressively opened to this crucial dimension of human interchangeability, as it were; 
things start to be seen less as a matter of my being disturbed or importuned by you, and more 
a matter of potential mutuality and reciprocity. It is this dimension that seems to be 
underlined elsewhere in the teachings of Christ. Having commanded his disciples to love one 
another, Christ immediately adds a kind of gloss: ‘as I have loved you, that you also love one 
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another’. And when, much later in the discourse in Chapter 15, he recapitulates the command, 
we once again find not just a bald instruction, but the same closely associated reciprocal 
clause: ‘this is my commandment, that you love one another just as I have loved you.’ (John 15: 
12). One could read this as merely an adverbial comparison— ‘love one another in the same 
way, or with the same degree of concern’; but it seems much more plausible to read it as a 
reason that that grounds the command, or comes very close to doing so. It is significant that 
earlier on in the same discourse we have the episode of the washing of the feet (with which 
the Mandatum is still closely associated in the Church’s liturgy for Holy Thursday), and here 
again we have exactly the same reciprocal link: ‘If I your master and teacher have washed 
your feet, so too you ought to wash one another’s feet.’ (John 13:14). 
How does the aspiring saint come to see that we must love one another? According to 
the suggestion proposed here, it is by having his or her eyes open to the fact that whether we 
like it or not we are bound in relations of reciprocity— this is the very essence of what it is to 
be human. I am not an isolated autonomous independent figure who can dole out benefits 
either to myself or to others as I see fit, on the basis of my lordly assessments of the 
requirements of ‘practical reason’; on the contrary, I need the love and concern of others 
every day of my life, from birth to death. And once I recognize my dependency, and the 
fulfilling and healing power of the loving action of another towards me, I cannot but recognize 
that I am bound to reach out in a similar way to others who need my care. This is surely the 
force of Christ’s demonstrating his love for the disciples in the foot-washing, and of his 
subsequently directly associating his own love for them with his appeal to the disciples to love 
each other. Although it is phrased as a commandment, it is in fact a piece of teaching, a 
guiding towards the rational enlightenment that discloses the unavoidable reasons-based 
imperative of love, grounded in the objective facts of human dependency and mutuality 
(Cottingham, forthcoming 2014). 
Of course it is one thing to grasp this intellectually and another to absorb it so deeply 
that it infuses one’s entire outlook and relationships with others. If the path to sainthood is a 
long and hard one, then the achievement of purity in life must be a matter of degree, and 
some have no doubt undergone more radical transformations in this respect than others. But 
the key point for present purposes is that progress along this path requires not just ‘moral 
fibre’— virtues (valuable though they are) like determination, perseverance, steadfast 
adherence to duty— but a constantly deepening perception of the meaning of what it is to be 
a vulnerable human being, and a resulting lifting of the veils that cut us off from ‘the least of 
these my brothers and sisters.’ (Matthew 25: 40). The change, in short, is not just a change in 
behaviour but in knowledge: what was before occluded about the status of my fellow humans 
and my relation to them comes plainly into view, as something that I now know and 
understand in its full significance. 
 
4. Saints versus heroes 
‘Saints’ are coupled with ‘heroes’ in the title of the influential philosophical article already 
mentioned (Urmson 1958); and in some of the more dubious products of today’s popular 
culture the two terms appear to have become virtually interchangeable. In a recent 
advertisement for one of the computer war-games that have become worryingly ubiquitous 
we find the following: ‘Saints and Heroes, the Unit Pack for Total War: honed by years of 
relentless training and tempered in the fires of battle, these elite warrior units excel in their 
fields, and stand head-and-shoulders above their rank-and-file brothers.’ Banal though these 
phrases are, they recall a type that has been widely admired and looked up to from ancient 
times, the strong man or champion who excels in ‘greatness’. Yet if we revert to our opening 
epigraph by William James, it is clear that he would have rejected any such lumping together 
of ‘saint’ and ‘hero’, since he sharply distinguishes saints from the ‘strong men of the world.’ 
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For all their power and seeming strength, James seems to suggest, heroes are curiously flat 
figures, lacking the psychological depth and true moral stature of the saint. 
 James’s insights here are prefigured in one of the most interesting reflections on the 
hero in Western literature, Tolstoy’s portrayal of Napoleon. Noting how Napoleon was 
idolized in his time by many cultivated Russian aristocrats, even when their country was on 
the point of being invaded by his forces, Tolstoy in his depiction of the retreat of the French 
army from Moscow allows us to see the underlying triviality and emptiness of the self-styled 
‘Emperor’:  
 
Napoleon, taking himself off home wrapped in a warm fur cloak and abandoning to their 
fate not only his comrades but men who (in his belief) were there because he had 
brought them there, feels que c’est grand [‘what greatness there is in all this!’], and his 
soul is at ease… Greatness would appear to exclude all possibility of applying standards 
of right and wrong… And it never enters anyone’s head that to admit a greatness not 
commensurable with the standard of right and wrong is merely to admit one’s own 
nothingness and immeasurable littleness. For us, who have the standard of good and evil 
given us by Christ… there is no greatness where simplicity, goodness and truth are 
absent.’ (Tolstoy 1966 [1869]: Bk 4, Part 3, Ch. 18)  
 
Tolstoy’s depiction of the ‘great’ hero Napoleon is sharply contrasted with the way he 
presents the Russian Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov. Superficially a not very prepossessing 
figure, elderly, awkward and somewhat infirm, widely ridiculed and criticized behind his 
back, Kutuzov is yet portrayed as one who is deeply motivated by compassion, and by a 
constant desire to minimize suffering and loss of life. As the French enemy retreats in 
disarray, desperately hungry and cold, he tells the troops: ‘You see what they are reduced to: 
worse than the poorest of beggars. While they were strong we did not spare them, but now 
we may even have pity on them. They are human beings too, isn’t that so, lads?’ (Tolstoy 
1966: Bk 4, Part 4, Ch. 6) 
 The famous (and nearly contemporaneous) philosophical reflections on heroism by 
Friedrich Nietzsche point in a very different direction, and provide a harsh critique of the 
Christian ideals of saintly compassion and concern for others that are extolled by Tolstoy. In 
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche rails against compassion, and those moralists of the ‘herd’, 
who ‘have an almost feminine inability to remain spectators, to let someone suffer.’ The 
outlook of those who follow the Christian ideal is contrasted with the spirit of the ‘new 
philosopher,’ which will ‘grow to such height and force that it feels the compulsion [for] a 
revaluation of values, under whose new pressure and hammer a conscience would be steeled, 
a heart turned to bronze’ (Nietzsche 1966 [1886]: §§202, 203). 
 The two contrasting visions of the moral landscape presented here by Tolstoy and by 
Nietzsche diverge so radically that one might suppose that the choice between them is a 
matter of arbitrary or subjective preference, and that the decision to follow the path of 
sainthood, which on any account may often lead to great personal sacrifice, can be based only 
on faith, not on rational argument or evidence. But some of the epistemological results that 
have emerged in our discussion of sainthood suggest otherwise. If the saint is one who 
undergoes a progressive deepening or purification of his or her perceptions and sensibilities, 
then it seems reasonable to assume that, as that process continues, certain features of the 
landscape will become salient which might earlier have escaped attention. By contrast, in his 
scorn for the ‘weakness’ of the herd, Nietzsche’s perception of his own status vis-à-vis that of 
others appears curiously blinkered. As Philippa Foot has observed, in looking down on 
‘inferiors’, as Nietzsche did, Nietzsche lacks that deep sense that ‘one is always, fundamentally, 
in the same boat as everyone else, and that therefore it is quite unsuitable for anyone to see 
himself as ‘grand’’ (Foot 1994: 9). Though Foot does not take up a Christian perspective, or 
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invoke the dynamics of the saintly life, her insight here clearly links up with our previous 
suggestions about the way in which vulnerability and mutuality lie at the centre of the 
Christian moral ideal.  
 This point is developed further by Martha Nussbaum, albeit in a way that is presented 
in entirely humanist terms: 
 
What should we think about a human being who insists on caring deeply for nothing that 
he himself does not control; who refuses to love others in way that open him to serious 
risks of pain and loss; who cultivates the hardness of self-command as a bulwark against 
all the reversals that life can bring? We could say, with Nietzsche, that this is a strong 
person. But there clearly is another way to see things. For there is a strength of a 
specifically human sort in the willingness to acknowledge … the limits and vulnerability of 
one’s body, one’s need for … friendship … the willingness to form attachments that can go 
wrong and cause deep pain, in the willingness to invest oneself in the world…There is, in 
short, a strength in the willingness to be porous rather than totally hard, in the willingness 
to be a mortal animal living in the world. (Nussbaum: 1994, 160)  
 
Both Foot and Nussbaum, though neither explicitly acknowledges it, could hardly have 
arrived at their views without being influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by the Judaeo-
Christian ethical tradition that mistrusts worldly greatness, and points us towards the shifts 
of perception that can disclose the value of compassion. The underlying idea is that the more 
altruistic and compassionate viewpoint flows from purified perception, from a more 
discerning awareness of the human condition; and this in turn entails that the superiority of 
the saint over the hero is in part an epistemic superiority: the saint is vividly aware of aspects 
of the universal human predicament to which the grand but essentially self-oriented ‘hero’ is 
blind. But putting it in these epistemic terms, thinking of the saint as one who has better or 
more vivid awareness of the vulnerability he or she shares with others, in turn prompts a 
further question. Can the rejection of the ‘heroic’ model for human life, in favour of the 
openness to others that is characteristic of sainthood, be understood in entirely humanistic 
terms, as both the philosophers just mentioned seem to suggest? Is the theistic dimension of 
sainthood simply a piece of historical baggage that can be discarded, so that we could 
preserve the moral insights associated with it within the framework of an entirely secular 
worldview? Or is there something about the nature of sainthood that makes a theistic 
framework indispensible for understanding it? To this important question we may now turn 
in the concluding section of our discussion. 
 
5. Sainthood and the theistic framework 
We began this chapter by noting the need for theological and philosophical discussion of 
sainthood to reach out, as far as possible, beyond the confines of the community of believers, 
in order to explore the psychological, ethical and epistemic dimensions of the phenomenon 
that should be of interest to all who are concerned to reflect on the human condition. Yet it is 
also clear that any attempt at a reductionistic or purely humanist account of saintliness would 
be seriously deficient. One could of course speak by extension of a ‘saintly’ person, meaning 
simply a very good or morally admirable person; but the connotations of the term ‘saint’ 
through the long history of Western thought and literature, together with the etymology of 
the term, which links it to the religious ideas of sanctity or holiness, locate its meaning firmly 
within a religious framework.  
The accounts we have of the lives of many of the most famous saints stress the extent 
to which those lives were informed by mystical experiences and ecstatic visions of the divine, 
often as the culmination of long periods of prayer and self-mortification (the sixteenth-
century mystic St Teresa of Avila is a paradigm case). It could perhaps be argued that such 
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direct perceptual visions of the divine are just as important an element in sainthood, or even 
more important, than the more practically oriented moral and epistemic transformations we 
have mainly been focusing on in this chapter. Against this, however, it seems clear that such 
mystical experiences, though a common feature of the lives of many saints, cannot be either a 
necessary or a sufficient condition of sainthood. Ecstatic visions, however frequent and vivid, 
could not qualify someone as a saint if their lives were morally dubious; and conversely, 
someone whose life was a true imitation of the self-sacrificial love of Christ could not 
plausibly be denied the title of a saint on the grounds that they had failed to undergo the 
kinds of experience Teresa underwent.  
Another way in which the concept of sainthood appears to require its being located 
within an explicitly theistic outlook concerns the virtues that characterize the saintly life. The 
highly influential framework articulated by Thomas Aquinas for understanding the ideal 
Christian life owes much to Aristotle’s theory of the virtues. This theory offers an account of 
the good life as manifesting both moral virtues (instilled by training and habit), and 
intellectual virtues (of practical wisdom and judgement) that ensure our conduct is rational 
and appropriate to the circumstances we encounter in life (Aristotle 325 BC: Book 2 and Book 
6). No doubt the Christian saint will need to have these ‘natural’ virtues, both moral and 
intellectual; but Aquinas goes on to describe the special nature of the additional ‘theological’ 
virtues, faith, hope and love, which cannot be acquired by natural means alone, but need to be 
‘infused’ by divine grace (Aquinas 1266-73: First Part of Second Part, qu. 63-5; cf. Stump 
2011). More generally, if we reflect on the theistic framework for understanding the human 
condition, at any rate within mainstream Christianity, it becomes clear that the search for 
moral perfection is never conceived as something that could be undertaken entirely on our 
own initiative or simply from our own resources. Theism is committed to the idea not just of 
an objective morality and objective standards to which a good human life must conform, but, 
much more than that, of a goal for human life that is laid down by the loving creator who is 
the source of all goodness, and who calls each of us towards that goal and provides the grace 
enabling us to strive towards it. 
 Allowing room for the role of divine grace thus seems to be an essential requirement 
for any plausible account of sainthood. There is a long history of theological disputation about 
the precise extent of the role of grace, from positions which make sainthood entirely a matter 
of divine bestowal of grace, to those which emphasise the contribution made by the human 
agent; and it is beyond the scope of the present chapter to explore these debates here. But if 
we look at some of the earliest accounts of sainthood, the story is often one of dramatic divine 
intervention to transform a sinful life, the paradigm case of this being the sudden conversion 
of St Paul when a blinding light appeared to him on the road to Damascus (Acts 9: 1-19). Paul 
describes himself as having been the ‘worst of sinners’, on whom God poured ‘more and more 
of his grace’ (1 Timothy 14-16). On the face of it, the conversion account makes Paul entirely 
passive, literally struck down by divine action ‘out of the blue’. But clearly the subsequent life 
of a convert should not be understood as a robotic or mechanical process— that would make 
it devoid of moral significance— but rather as a transformed human existence, bound up with 
an interior moral and spiritual regeneration. The conversion of St Augustine provides an 
interesting example here, since his own comments suggest that it did not happen without 
considerable resistance: he was extremely reluctant to abandon his former way of life 
(Augustine c. 398: Bk 1 and Bk 8). And this gives some support to the account of the role of 
grace that is offered by St Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, only when a person ceases to cling to 
past wrongdoing, only when their resistant will becomes quiescent, will there be room for an 
infusion of divine grace.  
So the salvific action of God, on this view, is not something operating entirely in spite 
of us, like the power of gravity; rather, some minimal degree of voluntary change on the part 
of the subject is necessary for grace to do its further work (for a compelling account of this 
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process, see Stump 2010: 165-7, drawing on Aquinas 1266-73: First Part of Second Part, 
qu.9). A secular analogy which some may find helpful here can be drawn from the world of 
psychotherapy: often individuals will be ‘blocked’ from perceiving certain truths about their 
behaviour, so that they find it impossible to change damaging perceptions and patterns of 
conduct. The result is that they appear locked into a destructive way of life that they are 
unable to break out of. Only when they are prepared to acknowledge their vulnerability and 
accept help, opening themselves to the often painful process of analysis, will the damaging 
projections start to be lifted. The process cannot be accomplished unaided; but equally there 
is need for an initial act of cooperation on the part of the subject for the healing process to get 
underway. Once again, both in this psychotherapeutic analogy, and in the religious idea of the 
operation of divine grace, we can see the intimate fusion of epistemic and moral components 
in the progress towards growth and healing. 
 The idea that there is an unavoidably theistic element in any acceptable account of 
sainthood is reinforced by considering the interior character of the saintly life. As described 
in countless biographies about the saints, and in many of the writings they themselves have 
left, the saintly life is not merely one of doing good; it is a life conceived as a ‘journey of the 
mind towards God’ (Itinerarium mentis in Deum) to quote the title of St Bonaventure’s famous 
work: a life sustained and formed by the disciplines of spirituality, such as prayer, fasting and 
meditation. Paul urges his followers to ‘pray without ceasing’ (1 Thessalonians 5:17), and the 
life of Christ, for Christians the pattern of holiness, is described in the Gospels as one not just 
of self-sacrificial action, but of constant prayer (Mark 1: 25; Matthew 14: 23; Luke 6:12; John 
17: 1-26). Prayer is often construed in our modern secular age as a primitive and 
superstitious attempt to gain benefits that would be better obtained by scientific methods 
(for example praying for a cure instead of consulting a doctor). But many scriptural and later 
sources suggest that its primary function is to bring the person praying closer to God. Christ is 
described in the Gospels, particularly the Fourth, as being at one with the Father; his status, 
for Christians, is of course unique, but it will be characteristic of all those we consider to be 
saints that they will aspire to ever closer identification with God and with the good, and in 
this sense the life of the Christian saint will be an ‘imitation of Christ’ (imitatio Christi), to 
quote from the title of a famous devotional text and handbook of spirituality from the 
fifteenth-century writer St Thomas à Kempis. Recapitulating a long theological tradition, 
Kempis aims to guide his readers along the path to ‘consolation and peace,’ ‘submission,’ 
‘purity of mind,’ ‘the joy of a good conscience,’ ‘putting up with discomfort,’ ‘gratitude for the 
grace of God,’ and ‘taking up the Cross’ (the phrases quoted are some of the headings from 
Book II of Kempis c. 1420).  
 Though this captures much of what is widely understood as belonging to the saintly 
life, the account of Kempis has been criticized as laying too much stress on the interior 
dimensions of sainthood. The twentieth-century theologian Hans Urs von Balthazar had 
Kempis specifically in his sights when he objected that ‘the love of God can only be fulfilled if 
it expands into the love of neighbour’ (Balthasar 2001: 103). A possible resolution of this 
tension between the ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ dimensions of the saintly life may perhaps be 
effected if we reflect further on the epistemic aspects of the ‘conversion of life’ referred to 
earlier (see above sections 1 and 3). The kind of conversion of life at which the saint aims is 
not just a matter of adopting certain spiritual practices and disciplines; nor is it simply a 
change in beliefs or in the theological doctrines that are espoused. Rather, it involves a 
fundamental epistemic shift, a shift in the way the world is perceived, and the way I view 
myself in relation to others. To borrow an observation of the theologian Sarah Coakley from a 
somewhat different context: 
 
What shifts … is not merely the range of vision afforded over time by the interplay of 
theological investigation and ascetical practice, but the very capacity to see. What is being 
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progressively purged … is the fallen and flawed capacity for idolatry, the tragic 
misdirecting of desire. One is learning, over a lifetime— and not without painful 
difficulty— to think, act, desire, and see aright. (Coakley 2013: 19-20)  
 
 For those who progress sufficiently far in this daunting task, there is, according to 
Christian doctrine, the hope of final blessedness. What this may mean in terms of the afterlife 
is no doubt a matter of revelation rather than rational determination; but there is a long 
tradition going back to the Gospels and to St Paul which speaks of the final vindication of 
those who suffer for righteousness’ sake, and of the incorruptible crown awaiting the saints in 
heaven (Matthew 5: 12; I Corinthians 9:24-5). However that may be, it is worth noting, as we 
bring this survey of saints and saintliness to a close, that construing the rewards of sainthood 
in purely eschatological terms would be to leave out something vitally important from the 
theistic picture of sainthood. The ‘blessedness’ of which the Gospels speak is surely not an 
external incentive offered to bolster an otherwise counter-intuitive picture of the way life 
should be lived. On the contrary, if, as the theist maintains, we are created by a source that is 
itself pure love, if we are made in that image, then our deepest fulfilment will lie in realizing 
that love in our lives. However imperfectly we may be able to pursue it, love must be the key 
to meaningfulness in the lives of each of us. Self-interested goods may be, as far as they go, 
authentic goods; but in the absence of love, as St Paul’s famous analysis in the first letter to 
the Corinthians tells us, they simply lose their significance and their pursuer becomes merely 
a ‘sounding gong’, or a ‘tinkling cymbal’ (I Corinthians 13:1; see Cottingham 2012, esp. section 
4). The acknowledged saint is one who carries that love to degree of devotion and self-
sacrifice that fills most of us with awe. But every human being, if the theistic vision is true, is 
called to advance as far as may be along that path. For our lives, on this vision, are not blank 
slates to be filled in as we happen to choose, but are governed by a cosmic teleology: like it or 
not, we are oriented towards a final supreme end— the good whose principal nature is love. 
The saintly life is one that grasps, in thought and action, where true human blessedness lies. 
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